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GOD AND THE INITIAL COSMOLOGICAL 
SINGULARITY: A REPLY TO QUENTIN SMITH 
William Lane Craig 
Q. Smith contends (i) an atheistic interpretation of the Big Bang is better 
justified than a theistic interpretation because the latter is inconsistent with 
the standard Big Bang model and (ii) his atheistic interpretation offers a 
coherent and plausible account of the origin of the universe. But Smith's 
argument for (i) is multiply flawed, depending on premisses which are false 
or at least mootable and a key invalid inference. Smith's attempt to demon-
strate the plausibility of the atheistic interpretation on the basis of its greater 
simplicity is based on false parallels between God and the initial cosmolog-
ical singularity. Smith's effort to prove that the atheist's contention that the 
universe came into being uncaused out of absolutely nothing is coherent rests 
upon a confusion between inconceivability and unimaginability and assumes 
without argument that the causal principle could not be a metaphysically 
necessary a posteriori truth. In any case, there are good grounds for taking 
the principle to be a metaphysically necessary, synthetic, a priori truth, in 
which case the atheistic interpretation is incoherent. 
Introduction 
"The most efficacious way to prove that God exists is on the supposition that 
the world is eternal," advised Thomas Aquinas. "For, if the world and motion 
have a first beginning, some cause must clearly be posited to account for this 
origin of the world and of motion ... , since nothing brings itself from potency 
to act, or from non-being to being. "I In Thomas's thinking, once it is conceded 
that the world began to exist, the argument is for all practical purposes over: 
it is obvious that a First Cause must exist. He therefore sought to prove God's 
existence on the more neutral presupposition of the eternity of the world; 
besides, the temporal finitude of the world could be known only by revelation, 
since the philosophical arguments for a beginning of the universe were, in 
his opinion, unsound. 
The discovery during this century that the universe is in a state of isotropic 
expansion has led, via a time-reversed extrapolation of the expansion, to the 
startling conclusion that at a point in the finite past the entire universe was 
contracted down to a state of infinite density, prior to which it did not exist. 
The standard Big Bang model, which has become the controlling paradigm 
for contemporary cosmology, thus drops into the theologian's lap just that 
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crucial premiss which, according to Aquinas, makes God's existence practi-
cally undeniable. 
Quentin Smith disagrees. He argues that the standard model "is actually 
inconsistent with theism" and that, therefore, an atheistic interpretation of the 
Big Bang "is in fact better justified than the theistic interpretation."2 He 
claims, indeed, to have established "a coherent and plausible atheistic inter-
pretation" of the origin of the universe. 
In support of this remarkable position, Smith presents the following argument: 
1. The Big Bang singularity is the earliest state of the universe. 
2. The earliest state of the universe is inanimate. 
3. No law governs the Big Bang singularity, and consequently there is no 
guarantee that it will emit a configuration of particles that will evolve 
into an animate universe. 
4. Therefore, the earliest state of the universe is not guaranteed to evolve 
into an animate state of the universe. 
5. If God creates a universe, He creates an animate universe. 
6. Therefore, if God created the earliest state of the universe, then He would 
have ensured that this state is animate or evolves into animate states of 
the universe. 
7. Therefore, God did not create the earliest state of the universe. 
Smith takes this argument to be a Big Bang cosmological argument for the 
non-existence of God. 
Critique of Smith s Argument 
Smith's argument seems multiply flawed. Consider, for example, premiss (1). 
The premiss is patient of two very different interpretations. This fact emerges 
in the argument's conclusion. From (1) and (7) it follows that 
8. God did not create the Big Bang singularity. 
This Smith takes to mean 
8'. The Big Bang singularity was an actual state uncreated by God, 
which is inconsistent with classical theism's doctrine of creation. But (8) 
could be taken to mean 
8". God refrained from creating the Big Bang singularity, 
that is to say, He, on the pattern of certain contemporary cosmologists, chose 
to "cut out" the singularity from the space-time manifold and create that 
manifold without that initial singular point. If this is all that Smith's argument 
proves, then it is not inconsistent with classical theism. If we take his argu-
ment to imply (8"), then by (1) we understand 
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1". The Big Bang singularity is the earliest state of the universe in the 
standard model, 
whereas Smith takes it to mean 
1'. The Big Bang singularity described by the standard model was the ac-
tual, earliest state of the universe. 
The theist who finds himself convinced by Smith's line of argument could 
escape inconsistency by denying (1 '). Such a move would raise interesting 
epistemological questions concerning the rationality of belief in creatio ex 
nihilo to which Smith has yet to give attention.3 
But (l') is vulnerable on other, more plausible grounds than this. For the 
question arises as to the ontological status of the singularity. It needs to be 
emphasized that this is not the same question as the reality of the singularity, 
as that expression is usually employed in contemporary cosmological theory. 
Certain singularities in physical theory are merely apparent, resulting from 
the coordinate system being used. For example, the Schwarzschild solution 
to Einstein's field equations in the General Theory of Relativity involves a 
coordinate singularity when the radius of the body in question equals twice 
its mass. This singularity results merely from the fact that Schwarzschild 
chose coordinates for his solution which are not applicable on this surface. 
By contrast, when the body's radius equals zero, a real, and not merely 
coordinate, singularity occurs. Now the initial cosmological singUlarity was 
certainly a real singUlarity. But that does not settle the question of its onto-
logical status. 
The ontological status of the Big Bang singularity is a metaphysical ques-
tion concerning which one will be hard-pressed to find a discussion in scien-
tific literature. The singularity does not exist in space and time; therefore it 
is not an event. Typically it is cryptically said to lie on the boundary of 
space-time. But the ontological status of this boundary point is virtually never 
discussed. 
For that reason I am not terribly impressed with Smith's statement that 
"Cosmologists find no difficulty in the concept of a space that has zero 
dimensions (a spatial point) and that exists for an instant.. .. "4 My own expe-
rience is that a question concerning the ontological status of the initial cos-
mological singularity is likely to be met with bewilderment or disclaimers 
about not being a philosopher. Mathematical models containing singular 
points do not carry their metaphysical interpretation on their faces. Now to 
my mind, at least, a good case can be made for the assertion that this singular 
point is ontologically equivalent to nothing. For consider an object of finite 
mass shrinking down to infinite density. In order for the object to be infinitely 
dense, any two points on its surface would have to be so close that they would 
have to finally coalesce into a single, extensionless, mathematical point. We 
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must resist the temptation to think of the singUlarity as a very, very, very 
small point. It has literally no size at all, zero dimensionality. But how is this 
ontologicallY different from nothing? Or again, consider what it would mean 
for an object to exist for less and less time until finally we reach a state at 
which it has no temporal duration whatsoever. Again we must resist the 
temptation to think that the singularity exists for ever so fleeting a moment. 
It has zero temporal duration. But how is this ontologically different from 
not existing at all? The singularity seems to be a mathematical conceptual-
ization which is ontologically equivalent to nothing.s 
If such a metaphysical interpretation of the singularity is correct, then premiss 
(1) is false. Smith's argument is therefore fallacious, since the universe did not 
begin at the singUlarity. Rather the universe, the space-time manifold, does not 
possess a first temporal instant, but exists at any moment arbitrarily close to the 
initial, cosmological singularity. It is therefore governed throughout its existence 
by natural laws so that its becoming animate could be physically guaranteed 
from any arbitrarily designated initial temporal segment. 
But the theist need not prove even so much in order to remove the teeth 
from Smith's argument. Plantinga has reminded us that in dealing with 
defeaters of theism, it is not necessary to supply a rebutting defeater-defeater: 
an undercutting defeater-defeater may do.6 So long as my interpretation of 
the ontological status of the singularity has even equal, if not superior, plau-
sibility to Smith's, his argument for God's non-existence is undercut. At the 
very least, I think, Smith must in all honesty admit that the ontological status 
of the singularity is so poorly understood today that such an interpretation is 
as equally valid as his own. But if that is so, then premiss (1') is at best 
unsubstantiated and therefore his argument fails to prove that the theistic 
interpretation is inconsistent and, therefore, that the atheistic interpretation 
is better justified, since the latter claim rests solely on the alleged inconsis-
tency of the theistic interpretation. 
Premisses (2) and (5) are also problematic. Smith's argument seems tacitly 
to assume that the only finite, animate life which exists is that which exists 
in the physical universe, for he equates God's intending "his creation to be 
animate" with God's intention to create an animate universe. But the problem 
is that according to Christian theism the physical universe does not exhaust 
the created order. There are also realms of spiritual substances, or angels, 
which are part of the created order. Suppose God created the angelic realms prior 
to creating the physical universe. In such a case, creation is already animate 
before the work of physical creation has begun. So why is God obliged to 
guarantee ab initio that the physical order is animate? Indeed, why must the 
physical order ever become animate in such a case? What these considerations 
suggest is that even if Smith's argument were effective against some bare-
boned theism, it still might not have any relevance to Christian theism. 
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But premiss (5) has more serious shortcomings than this. For, we may ask, 
is (5) necessarily true? Are there no possible worlds in which God creates an 
inanimate universe? Smith thinks that "It is essential to the idea of God in 
the ludaeo-Christian-Islamic tradition that if he creates a universe he creates 
an animate universe ... " and that God's creating an inanimate universe is 
therefore "at odds" with classical theism.7 But if we take Aquinas as our 
guide, that does not seem to be the case. On his view, rational creatures 
enhance the goodness of the universe, but there is no necessity that God create 
them. He writes, "God wills man to have a reason in order that man may be; 
He wills man to be so that the universe may be complete; and He wills that 
the good of the universe be because it befits His goodness."8 Thomas goes 
on to explain that some things are willed by God with a necessity of suppo-
sition (for example, that man be endowed with reason, if God wills that man 
exist), others as useful but not necessary to some end, and still others as 
merely befitting His goodness. This last relation is conceived by him to be 
extremely weak; something so willed is willed by God's good pleasure as 
appropriate to, but not required by, His goodness. Hence, even if it is neces-
sary that God will man's existence in order for the goodness of the universe 
to be complete, there is no necessity that God will that the goodness of the 
universe be complete. God could have willed that a universe without intelli-
gent life-or without life at all-exist. This does not imply, pace Smith, that 
God therefore has no reason for willing that animate beings exist. On the 
contrary, Aquinas affirms that a reason can be assigned for the divine will, 
but that this reason is contingent. Smith is therefore mistaken in thinking that 
willing an inanimate universe is impossible for God according to classical 
theism, nor has he provided any argument to show that classical theism is 
mistaken in this regard. 
Or consider the inference drawn in (6), which seems clearly invalid. Smith 
understands (6) to mean that if God "creates a first state of the universe, he 
creates a state that is, or is guaranteed to evolve into, an animate state."9 But 
even if we concede the truth of (5), how does it follow that (6) is true? There 
are two ways in which a provident God could create an animate universe out 
of a necessarily inanimate initial singularity: (i) By His middle knowledge, 
God could have known that had He actualized the Big Bang singularity, an 
animate universe would have evolved from it, or (ii) By His miraculous 
intervention, God could causally bring about an animate universe. Since I 
have defended (i) elsewhere,1O I shall say something only about (ii). Smith's 
argument against (ii) is that it is irrational and inefficient for God to create 
a first state of the universe which does not tend to the end for which the 
universe is created. But as Thomas Morris points out in another context,11 
there are at least two things wrong with applying standards of efficiency to 
God: (1) Efficiency is relative to the ends desired. We do not think an artist 
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inefficient and therefore irrational if he prefers actually painting a work of 
art over simply having, if he could, the finished product, for we recognize 
that his intention is not simply to have a painting, but to go through the artistic 
process of creating it. Similarly, God could have all sorts of reasons for being 
causally involved in the process of creation (for example, to leave a revelation 
of Himself through His handiwork in nature; see Rom. 1:21). (2) Efficiency 
is significant only to someone with limited time or limited power or both. 
But to God what need is there to be concerned with efficiency? Smith's 
objection inappropriately imposes anthropocentric values upon God. There 
is therefore no inconsistency in God's creating a universe governed by quan-
tum physics, which necessitates (in the absence of middle knowledge) His 
causal involvement in the series of secondary causes in order to achieve His 
ends. Smith's key inference therefore seems to be plainly mistaken, and so 
his argument fails. 
Atheistic vs. Theistic Interpretation of the Big Bang 
But what, in any case, is Smith's "atheistic interpretation" of the Big Bang 
and what warrant does it enjoy? Although he does not develop this interpre-
tation at any length, it would appear to be that the initial, cosmological 
singularity inexplicably "exists and emits the four-dimensional spatio-tem-
poral universe. "12 But at this point one must be very careful. For although 
Smith uses here tenseless language to describe the origin of the universe, 
Smith is no B-theorist of time who thinks that the entire spacetime manifold 
(plus any singular points) exists tenselessly. Rather Smith is an ardent A-the-
orist who rejects tenseless language and regards even abstract objects as 
having temporal duration. Hence, in no sense of the term are we to think of 
the initial cosmological singularity as possessing the property of permanence, 
which has been so effectively analyzed elsewhere by Smith. 13 On an A-theory 
of time, the singularity is neither sempiternal, omnitemporal, everlasting, 
infinite in the past and future, beginningless and endless in time, endlessly 
recurrent, eternal, nor merely timeless. In order for any of these predicates 
to apply to the singularity, one must adopt a B-theory, according to which 
the singularity does not come to be or pass away, but tenselessly exists. On 
Smith's A-theoretic view, the first physical state of the universe came to be 
without any temporally preceding states whatsoever and immediately emitted 
the spacetime manifold. Moreover, this coming to be is admitted to be unex-
plained, that is, without cause or reason.14 
What possible warrant could there be for such an incredible scenario? If it 
enjoys no independent support or inherent plausibility apart from the alleged 
inconsistency of the theistic interpretation, then with the failure of Smith's 
argument, its epistemic warrant shrinks to zero. Smith, however, does offer 
an argument in favor of his interpretation: it is simpler than the theistic 
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hypothesis. Noting that the singularity has zero spatial volume, zero temporal 
duration, and non-finite values for its density, temperature, and curvature, 
Smith contends that it is the simplest possible physical object, even as God 
is the simplest possible person. They are thus on a par with each other. Both 
God and the initial, cosmological singularity exist unexplained and so are 
also on a par in this respect. But "It is simpler to suppose that the 4D physical 
universe began from the simplest instance of the same basic kind as itself, 
viz., something physical, than it is to suppose that this universe began from 
the simplest instance of a different kind, viz., something nonphysical and 
personal. "15 
Smith's argument, however, depends on a parallelism between God and the 
initial cosmological singularity which seems clearly exaggerated. For the 
sense in which God is unexplained is radically different from the sense in 
which the initial, cosmological singularity is unexplained. Both can be said 
to be without cause or reason. But when we say that God is uncaused we 
imply that He is eternal, that He exists either timelessly or sempiternally. His 
being uncaused implies that He exists permanently. But the singularity is 
uncaused in the sense that it comes into being without any efficient cause. It 
is impermanent, indeed, vanishingly so. These hypotheses can therefore 
hardly be said to be on a par with each other. Moreover, God is without a 
reason for His existence in the sense that His existence is metaphysically 
necessary. But the singularity's coming to be is without a reason in the sense 
that, despite its contingency, it lacks any reason for happening. Again these 
hypotheses are fundamentally different. The hypothesis that the universe was 
brought into being by an eternal, metaphysically necessary being hardly 
seems on a par with the hypothesis that the singularity inexplicably and 
causelessly came into being. Thus, Smith's parallelism between God and the 
singUlarity evaporates once the alleged parallels are examined. 
As for the simplicity argument itself, Smith's case for the superiority of 
the atheistic interpretation is, in effect, that only on the atheistic hypothesis 
does the spacetime universe have a material cause, namely, the singUlarity. 
But that is a red herring. For the theist could also maintain that the universe 
emerged from a physical singularity, adding that the latter was created by 
God. The real issue is rather the origin of the singularity itself. On the theistic 
hypothesis the spacetime manifold plus its initial singular point was brought 
into being by God. But on Smith's hypothesis the spacetime manifold plus 
its initial singularity came to be without any cause or reason. Hence, atheism 
is not explanatorily simpler than theism after all, since physical reality did 
not begin from an "instance of the same basic kind as itself, viz., something 
physical." In fact, on Smith's own principle concerning simplicity and dif-
ference in kind, theism is arguably a simpler hypothesis, since, as Duns 
Scotus put it, there is an infinite distance between being and non-being, and 
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theism posits the origin of being by being, whereas atheism posits the origin 
of being from non-being. 
Smith now goes on the defensive, claiming that the principle 
P2: It is impossible for being to arise uncaused out of absolutely nothing 
is not "intuitively obvious. "16 He denies that this principle is a synthetic a 
priori truth. He explains, 
... the evidence that a proposition is a synthetic a priori truth is that it cannot 
be conceived to be false (in any possible world) and is not tautological or 
analytic .... But this is not the case for our causal propositions. I can conceive 
the possibility of the universe beginning to exist uncaused. 17 
If the theist responds that our being able to mentally picture the universe's 
coming into being without a cause does not imply that it really can come into 
being without a cause, Smith will answer that such a response fails to distin-
guish between a posteriori and a priori metaphysically necessary truths. A 
state of affairs which is known a posteriori to be metaphysically necessary 
can, indeed, be conceived as not obtaining. But states of affairs known a 
priori to be metaphysically necessary cannot be conceived as not obtaining; 
that is why they are said to be known a priori. Hence, for the relevant causal 
principle to be true, it must express a state of affairs which is known a 
posteriori to be metaphysically necessary. But no one has maintained so 
implausible a supposition. 
It seems to me that Smith's account of metaphysically necessary truths is, 
however, confused. When Kripke distinguished between metaphysically nec-
essary a priori truths and metaphysically necessary a posteriori truths, he 
made it quite clear that a truth's being necessary is not to be equated with 
its being a priori. Given this distinction, Smith is incorrect that the evi-
dence for a proposition's being synthetic a priori is the inconceivability 
of its falsehood and its being neither tautological nor analytic. That evi-
dence shows the proposition to be necessary and synthetic, but does not 
give indication of whether it is knowable a priori or a posteriori. More-
over, it is incorrect that metaphysically necessary a posteriori truths can 
be conceived as false. Kripke explains that when he says that gold might 
have turned out not to have the atomic number 79, he does not mean that 
gold might actually have a different atomic number. He means that one 
could have been in the qualitatively same epistemic situation that in fact 
obtains, but something else like gold would have existed. Given that gold 
has atomic number 79, it is strictly speaking inconceivable that gold 
should have any other atomic number. "Any necessary truth, whether a 
priori or a posteriori, could not have turned out otherwise. In the case of 
some necessary a posteriori truths, however, we can say that under appro-
priate qualitatively identical evidential situations, an appropriate qualitative 
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statement might have been false. "18 Therefore, Smith errs in thinking it to be 
"the distinguishing mark" of metaphysically necessary a priori truths that 
they cannot be conceived to be false. 
It seems to me that Smith is confusing imagining a world with conceiving 
a world. We can certainly imagine a world in which gold has a different 
atomic number, but this amounts to no more than our ability to form a mental 
picture and label it "A World in which Gold Does Not Have Atomic Number 
79." In a similar way, we can form a mental picture of a being's popping into 
existence out of nothing and label it "X's Coming into Being Out of Nothing," 
but that does not show that such a world is conceivable. 
If, then, we substitute "imaginable" for "conceivable," Smith's argument 
seems to amount to the following: 
9. If P2 is metaphysically necessary, it must be knowable ·a priori. 
10. If a proposition is knowable a priori, its contradictory must be unimagin-
able. 
11. We can imagine the contradictory of P2 to be true. 
12. Therefore, P2 is not knowable a priori. 
13. Therefore, P2 is not metaphysically necessary. 
But why should we regard (10) as true? Presented with a complicated math-
ematical formula, I can certainly imagine a world in which it is not true, even 
if it is knowable a priori. I see no reason to think that there is an inherent 
connection between a truth's being knowable a priori and the unimaginability 
of its contradictory. Or consider (9). Smith never explains why P2 cannot be 
a metaphysically necessary a posteriori truth. According to Kripke, all of his 
examples of metaphysically necessary a posteriori truths have a character 
such that we see that if they are true at all, they are necessarily true, so that 
any empirical knowledge of their truth is automatically empirical knowledge 
of their necessity.19 So why is it implausible that we should see that the 
proposition "Being does not arise uncaused out of absolute nothing" is nec-
essarily true, if true at all, and see on the basis of experience that it is true? 
This seems perfectly plausible to me. 
In any case, it does seem to me that P2 expresses a metaphysically neces-
sary, synthetic, a priori proposition. Consider Aquinas's point with which we 
began this paper. A pure potentiality cannot be conceived to actualize itself. 
Therefore, there must be an actual cause for anything's coming to exist. In 
the case of creation, there was not anything physically prior to the singularity. 
Therefore, it is impossible that the potentiality of the existence of the universe 
lay in itself, since it did not exist. On the theistic view, the potentiality of the 
universe's existence lay in the power of God to create it. On the atheistic 
interpretation, on the other hand, there did not even exist any potentiality for 
A REPLY TO QUENTIN SMITH 247 
the existence of the universe. But then it seems inconceivable that the uni-
verse should come to be actual if there did not exist any potentiality for its 
existence. It seems to me therefore that a little reflection discloses that our 
mental picture of the universe "aris[ing] uncaused out of absolutely nothing" 
is just that: pure imagination. It is strictly inconceivable. 
Hence, far from being simpler than the theistic hypothesis of creation, the 
atheistic interpretation is less simple, has zero explanatory power, and in the 
end degenerates into metaphysical absurdity. 
Conclusion 
Enjoying no greater consistency than its theistic rival, with no positive argu-
ment to commend it, and unable to escape the charge of metaphysical absurd-
ity leveled against it, Smith's atheistic interpretation of the Big Bang appears 
to be untenable. If the standard model is correct, it does seem to constitute a 
powerful argument for the existence of a Creator of the universe. Smith leaves 
it open that the model may be false and some other model not involving an 
initial cosmological singularity be true. Perhaps, though there are reasons to 
doubt that an absolute beginning can be avoided through such models; but 
that is a debate for another day.20 
Institut Superieure de Philosophie 
Universite Catholique de Louvain 
NOTES 
1. Thomas Aquinas Summa contra gentiles 1.13.30. (Pegis translation.) 
2. Quentin Smith, "A Big Bang Cosmological Argument for God's Non-Existence," 
Faith and Philosophy, this issue, p. 218. 
3. See Thomas V. Morris, "Creatio ex nihilo, "in Anselmian Investigations (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), pp. 151-60. Morris argues that belief in creatio 
ex nihilo gains in rationality as the number of empirical beliefs it forces us to abandon 
decreases. Cutting out the singularity would sacrifice a minimal number of such beliefs. 
4. Smith, "Cosmological Argument for God's Non-Existence," p. 226. 
5. Analogous equivalencies elsewhere in science may help to drive home the point. For 
example, in discussions of the conventionality of simultaneity in relativity theory, one 
speaks of synchronization of spatially separated clocks by means of the slow transport of 
clocks from one place to another. It is claimed that by transporting clocks at progressively 
slower velocities, one can approach absolute synchronization, which would result from a 
clock transported from one place to another at infinitely slow velocity. But no one takes 
infinitely slow transport of clocks as describing an actual procedure, since infinitely slow 
velocity is ontologically equivalent to rest, that is, to no transport at all! 
6. Alvin Plantinga, "Foundations of Theism," Faith and Philosophy 3 (1986): 298-313. 
248 Faith and Philosophy 
7. Smith, "Cosmological Argument for God's Non-Existence," p. 224. 
8. Thomas Aquinas Summa contra gentiles 1.86.5. 
9. Smith, "Cosmological Argument for God's Non-Existence," p. 224. 
10. William Lane Craig, "Theism and Big Bang Cosmology," Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, 69 (1991): 492-503. 
11. Thomas V. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1986), pp. 77-78. 
12. Smith, "Cosmological Argument for God's Non-Existence," p. 228. 
13. See Smith's helpful analysis in "A New Typology of Temporal and Atemporal 
Permanence," Nous, 23 (1989), 307-30. 
14. In discussing the origin of the universe, one runs the risk of being bamboozled by 
his own language, for expressions like "The universe came to be" or "The universe came 
into being out of nothing without a cause" or "God created the universe out of nothing" 
might lead the uninitiated to infer that one means that there was a state of nothingness 
temporally prior to the first event from which the universe was created. But as Aquinas 
recognized, the import of creatio ex nihilo is that there was not anything temporally or 
metaphysically prior to the universe out of which it was made (Summa contra gentiles 
2.16.4; 2.17.2; 2.36.7). It is very difficult to express this idea in a non-misleading way 
because the mere assertion that the universe or time began to exist can be interpreted by 
the B-theorist in such a way as to obscure the radicalness of this claim, whereas attempts 
to capture the A-theoretic sense of the assertion (e.g., "The universe came into being out 
of nothing") may sound analogous to the statement "John came into the house out of the 
rain," which betrays one's true meaning. What one means is that the universe started to 
exist without any temporal or causal antecedents and that this is a tensed fact. Fortunately, 
Smith understands this and nowhere objects to such expressions and occasionally even 
uses them himself. 
15. Smith, "Cosmological Argument for God's Non-Existence," p. 228. 
16. Ibid., p. 233. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, rev. ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p. 
142. 
19. Ibid., p. 159. 
20. See, for example, William Lane Craig, '''What Place, Then, for a Creator:' Hawking 
on God and Creation," British Journalfor the Philosophy of Science, 41 (1990):473-91; 
idem, "The Caused Beginning of the Universe: a Response to Quentin Smith," British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming). 
